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Discussion around the optimality of foreign exchange reserves has 
intensified recently, due to a seeming ineficient increasing of foreign reserves, 
especially in the developing world. This paper presents the state of this issue, 
challenging the conventional perspective according to which foreign exchange 
reserves are needed in order to preserve the stability of exchange rates. It argues 
that reserves’ a 
 
  Foreign exchange reserves in the world: a synoptic view 
 
The role and the optimality of foreign exchange reserves in the international 
monetary system have been for long time interesting issues in the literature on 
international monetary economics. Discussion around these problems has 
intensified lately, as a consequence of a noticeable increase in the magnitude of 
world foreign exchange reserves. Indeed, “one of the most striking developments 
of the last few years is the enormous increase of foreign exchange holdings by 
central banks, especially in many emerging and transition economies” (Vaubel, 
2005, p. 1). This observation is uphold by another keen analyst of the international 
economy: “Foreign exchange reserves held by developing nations are today at an 
all time high, and stand at levels that are a multiple of those held by advanced 
countries (in relation to their incomes or trade)” (Rodrik, 2006, p. 2). 
As this author ilustrates, unlike developed countries, developing countries 
have constantly increased their holdings of foreign reserves, not only in nominal 
terms, but also relative to their GDP. More exactly, the foreign reserves/GDP ratio 
is ten times higher now than three decades ago, when it was roughly equal to the 
ratio kept by the rich countries.  
This trend has ben especially abrupt after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
Since then, monetary authorities in emerging markets in East Asia have more than 
doubled their stockpiles of foreign exchange reserves; by the end of May 2002, 
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they held $845 billion, or 38% of the world total. Of these countries, China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore rank just behind Japan as the 
world's biggest holders of foreign exchange reserves – together those five 
countries hold reserves totaling nearly $700 billion.  
   Among the developing countries, the increase in official foreign exchange 
holdings has been largest in Africa (+180 per cent), Eastern Europe (+176 per 
cent) and Asia (+145 per cent). Overall, the largest increases took place in Algeria 
(666 per cent), Russia (531 per cent), India (372 per cent), Lithuania (360 per 
cent), South Korea (350 per cent), China (272 per cent). 
Romania’s foreign exchange reserves is currently 50 times higher than the 
level existent in 1996. It covers 6 months of imports and is almost double the 
amount of foreign short-term debt. 
Reasons 
Among the main reasons for accumulating foreign exchange reserves is the 
role they can play as a buffer or shield against financial crises. Countries with 
higher (net) levels of liquid foreign assets are better able to withstand panics in 
financial markets and sudden reversals in capital flows. 
In the face of an increasing number of international financial crises (notable 
examples include Mexico in 1995, East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Turkey in 
1994 and 2001, Brazil in 1999, and Argentina in 2002)  a growing literature 
emerged on the level of reserves necessary to adequately insure against shocks. In 
that literature, several basic benchmarks for emerging economies were suggested. 
First, it was argued that countries shoud preserve reserves equal to short-
term external debt. The rationale for this correlation is the following. Countries 
that may be vulnerable to a capital account crisis can benefit from holding 
reserves sufficient to cover all debt obligations falling due within the coming year. 
This benchmark, known as the Greenspan-Guidotti rule, is the most widely 
preferred benchmark for measuring vulnerability to capital account crisis, and its 
relevance to currency crisis prevention has the strongest empirical support. 
Secondly, economists maintained that foreign exchange reserves should be 
equal to roughly 5-20 percent of M2. Behind this policy prescription lies the 
hypothesis that paper money has to be covered by “something” – a valuable thing, 
which in the past was gold. Countries that intend to maintain a fixed exchange 
rate need to hold higher reserves relative to M2. 
Thirdly, aome argued that reserves should be equal to three or four months 
of imports. This criterion is especially relevant to low-income countries exposed 
to current account shocks and without significant access to capital markets. 
 The emerging economies among the top ten reserve holders maintain 
reserves far in excess of nearly all of the benchmarks, as shown in the table 
below. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 1, No. 4 
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Developing countries adequacy reserve ratios, 2005 
 
 Debt  Reservs/M2  Reserves/Months 
of imports 
Benchmark  Country 
1.00  0.05 – 0.20  3.00 
China 11.58  0.22  15.72 
Taiwan 5.95  0.35  15.65 
Russia 4.43  0.93  16.40 
India 4.29  0.80  13.17 
South Korea  2.63  0.21  7.93 
Malaysia 3.09  0.43  7.49 
 
 
In addition to all these reasons, it is said that central banks accumulate 
foreign exchange reserves for political reasons. Public choice literature asserts that 
central banks seek to obtain or increase their power and prestige.
1  
 
The costs of keeping foreign exchange reserves 
 
  Some economists have started to question the utility of such enormous 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, emphasing the costs associated with 
this policy. Intuitively, the opportunity cost of hoarding money is the income that 
could be gained if the same amount of cash is invested in profitable economic 
projects. As Rodrik (2006, p. 2) explains, “central banks hold their foreign 
exchange reserves mostly in the form of low-yielding short-term U.S. Treasury 
(and other) securities. Each dollar of reserves that a country invests in these assets 
comes at an opportunity cost that equals the cost of external borrowing for that 
economy (or alternatively, the social rate of return to investment in that economy). 
The spread between the yield on liquid reserve assets and the external cost of 
funds – a difference of several percentage points in normal times—represents the 
social cost of self-insurance”. 
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Another viewpoint 
 
From the very beginning it should be pointed out that under a gold standard, 
foreign exchange reserves would be completely unnecessary. The keeping of 
foreign exchange reserves is a normal feature of a system of coexisting (i.e. 
competing) fiat money producers. Only in a system of paper moneys issued by 
independent central banks, each of these institutions seeks to “hedge” its currency 
against the potential risk of depreciation. It can do so either – the easy way – by 
refreining from inflating the money supply or – the hard way – by accumulating 
foreign exchange reserves in order to “defend” the value of its currency when the 
general public chooses to turn to a different currency. 
Thus, the existence of foreign exchange reserves grants each central bank a 
“space of maneuvre” within which it can engineer an expansionist monetary 
policy without the fear that inflation could be nipped in the bud by the changing 
preferences of an alert public. In other words, it is a way to enhance its credibility. 
As Vaubel (2005, p. 3) expalins further, “this option of increasing the money 
supply without depreciating the currency is also highly attractive to politicians 
who want to generate a boom at the time of the next election. Under fixed 
exchange rates and possibly even under flexible exchange rates, foreign exchange 
"reserves" facilitate monetary political business cycles.” 
  From a larger perspective, the policy of accumulating foreign exchange 
reserves is self-enforcing. On the one hand, it allows domestic central bank to 
increase its money supply without fear of suffering depreciation. On the other 
hand, it turns into a higher demand for the international currency hoarded as 
foreign reserve. But this increase in demand provides to the foreign money 
producer the same opportunity of extending its own money supply without 
running the risk of generating a monetary crisis. In the words of Vaubel (2005, p. 
7), “thus, by accumulating foreign exchange reserves, the domestic central bank 
tends to encourage inflationary monetary policies abroad. The Bundesbank 
committed this mistake in the final years of the Bretton Wood System – it even 
contributed to the American pre-election boom of 1972. The central banks of the 
emerging and transition countries have been doing exactly the same in the recent 
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Official Foreign Exchange Holdings, in billions of SDRS 
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Figure 3 
 